Mercer Law Review
Volume 50
Number 2 Articles Edition

Article 6

3-1999

Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes: Ending
Debate on Political Debates
Daniel B. Greenfield

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Greenfield, Daniel B. (1999) "Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes: Ending Debate on
Political Debates," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 50 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol50/iss2/6

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

CASENOTES

Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes:
Ending Debate on Political Debates

In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,' the
Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether, and under what
circumstances, a public television network may exclude a so-called
"minor" candidate from its televised debate. The Court, voting six to
three, reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and upheld the right of the Arkansas Educational
Television Commission to exclude the candidate.' The Court held that
the debate was a nonpublic forum and that a broadcaster could limit
debate participants in the reasonable exercise of its journalistic
discretion so long as the candidate was not excluded because of his
political views.'
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1992 the state-owned Arkansas Educational Television Commission
("AETC") produced five televised candidate debates for broadcast on

1. 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
2. Id. at 1644.
3. Id. at 1643.
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AETC's Arkansas Educational Television Network ("AETN"). In June
1992, AETC sent invitations to all ballot-qualified candidates for
Arkansas's congressional races, which then included only Democrat and
Republican nominees.
In August, Ralph Forbes, an independent
candidate for the Third Congressional District, gained the requisite
number of petition signatures required by Arkansas law to appear on the
ballot,4 and requested permission to participate in the October 22
debate. Forbes was a "perennial candidate who had sought, wvithout
success, a number of elected offices in Arkansas."' Susan Howarth,
AETC Executive Director, denied Forbes's request in writing, citing her
"bona fide journalistic judgment" that AETC's viewers would be "best
served" by including only the candidates already invited.' Forbes then
sued for injunctive relief, claiming a First Amendment right to participate in the debate and alleging that AETC was excluding him in order
to keep the public from hearing his views. 7 On October 20, the district
court denied Forbes's motion for a preliminary injunction, and the debate
aired without him.' Forbes amended his complaint on November 2 (the
day before the election), alleging additional statutory and regulatory
violations by AETC, its officers, and several other defendants.9
The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, ° both on substantive
grounds and because Forbes failed to exhaust administrative remedies
provided by the Federal Communications Commission." On appeal,

4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-103(c)(1) (Michie 1993).
5. 118 S. Ct. at 1638.
6. Id. "AETC professional staff testified that Forbes was excluded because he lacked
any campaign organization, had not generated appreciable voter support, and was not
regarded as a serious candidate by the press covering the election." Id. Howarth testified
that "the addition of a third-party candidate in whom the public had shown little interest
would significantly dilute the time available for discussion of issues by the candidates in
whom the viewing public was interested." Petitioner's Brief, Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, No.
96-779, 1997 WL 311440, at *10 (July 2, 1997) (quoting Tr. 201 (S. Howarth), J.A. 119).
7. Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 22 F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994).
8. Id.
9. Id. Forbes alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (governing equal rights
under the law), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (claiming AETN failed to provide him with equal
time), and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994) (alleging a conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights).
Forbes sought enforcement of these statutes through 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994) (a portion of
what is commonly known as the "Communications Act" relating to Rules for Political
Candidates). Forbes also included two commercial television stations (KHBS-TV and
KHOG-TV) as defendants in his amended complaint because they refused to air one of his
anti-abortion advertisements outside the time period of 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Id. at 142627.
10. FED. R. Cv. P. 12(b)(6).
11. 22 F.3d at 1427-28.
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the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the statutory
claims, but reversed on Forbes's First Amendment constitutional
claim.' 2 The court overturned then-current precedent13 and ruled
that, because AETN was state-owned, Forbes had a "qualified right of
access... and that AETN must have a legitimate reason to exclude him
strong enough to survive First Amendment scrutiny."' 4 The court
remanded the case to determine the proper forum classification for the
debate (and thus clarify Forbes's right of access) and to determine
whether AETC's reason for exclusion was sufficient for that classification."5 On remand, the district court ruled as a matter of law that the
debate was a nonpublic forum, and that Forbes's exclusion was
impermissible only if it was motivated by Forbes's viewpoints or as a
result of political pressure. 6 The jury found that this was not the case,
and judgment was entered for Defendants.' Forbes again appealed. 8
In 1995 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case for the
second time. Forbes challenged the district court's characterization of
the forum and its holding that AETC's stated reason for his exclusion
from the debate (that he was not a "viable" candidate) was sufficient.' 9
The court of appeals declined to disturb the jury's finding that Forbes
was not excluded because of his views.2 ° The court agreed that if the
debate was indeed a nonpublic forum, AETC's reasons were sufficient to
support a verdict in its favor.2 ' However, the court held that because
"AETN, by staging the debate, opened its facilities to a particular
group- candidates running for the Third District Congressional seat,"
AETN had, in fact, created a limited public forum.22 The court then
held that AETC's subjective opinion of Forbes's viability constituted
insufficient grounds to exclude him from that class of participants
because a "viability threshold" was ruled to be "neither compelling nor
narrowly tailored" to advance AETC's goal of serving its public television

12. Id. at 1428-30.
13. See DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990).
14. 22 F.3d at 1428.
15. Id. at 1430. Because of the speed of procedural events, AETC had not yet filed an
answer to Forbes's original claim, and so AETC's reason for excluding him could not yet
be evaluated.
16. Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 499 (8th Cir. 1995).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 499-500.
20. Id. at 504.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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audience. 2 ' AETC appealed, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.2 4
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Regulation of broadcasters' presentations of political speech began in
1927 with the emergence of what became known as the fairness
doctrine. 25 A complementary statutory requirement, known as the
equal time provision, was created as part of the Communications Act of
1934.6 The Communications Act also created the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), the regulatory agency responsible for
enforcing the Act's provisions.27
In 1969 the constitutionality of both the fairness doctrine and the
equal time provision was explicitly affirmed by the Supreme Court. In
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,25 the Court confirmed the FCC's
right to force a radio station to provide equal time for an author who
was the victim of a personal on-air attack, while also confirming the
29
FCC's authority to revoke the license of a station that did not comply.
The court held that "it does not violate the First Amendment to treat
licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies
for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention
to matters of great public concern." °
Four years later, the Court clarified the extent of broadcasters'
obligation to air political speech in Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.
v. DemocraticNational Committee," which combined appeals from two

23. Id. at 505.
24. Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997).
25. The fairness doctrine requires that when "a discussion of public issues [is]
presented. ...each side of these issues be given fair coverage." The 'FairnessDoctrine"
74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommunications § 154 (1974).
26. "Ifany licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1994).
The statute provides exceptions for bona fide newscasts, bona fide news
interviews, bona fide documentaries, and "on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events"
(including political conventions). Id.
27. 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
28. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Supreme Court also granted certiorari for United States
v. Radio Television News Dirs.Ass'n ('RTNDA"), which concerned substantially the same
issue, and combined the two cases into one appeal. RTNDA represented a group of
broadcasters concerned that new rules which purported to clarify the fairness doctrine were
an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of the press. Id.
29. Id. at 394.
30. Id.
31. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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separate cases. 32 In one case, the Democratic National Committee
("DNC") sought a declaratory ruling from the FCC that a broadcaster
could not, as a general rule, refuse to sell air time to "responsible
parties" presenting opinions on a political issue. In the other, "Business
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace" had sued to force a radio station to
air its editorial ads.3 3 The FCC sided with the broadcasters in each
case, but the court of appeals reversed. 34 The Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, upholding the FCC's original decision.3" Seven
Justices agreed that the broadcasters, although licensed by the
government, were not themselves government, but rather were private
entities whose journalistic decisions were entitled to more First
Amendment protection than any individual or group desiring air time (so
long as the broadcaster provided balanced
coverage of controversial
36
issues consistent with FCC regulations).
With control over access to the private airwaves firmly in the hands
of broadcasters, courts began considering whether the same rules applied
to public broadcasters.3 ' The first case to address this issue was
decided in 1982, and it concerned the alleged right of individual viewers
to compel public television networks to broadcast a particular program.
In Muir v. Alabama Educational Televison Commission,38 two public
television networks3 9 decided not to televise a program critical of the
Saudi Arabian government, allegedly because of the United States
government's concern over the damage the program might cause to U.S.Saudi relations. 4' The producers and several viewers sued to force the

32. Id. Here, as in Red Lion, the Court chose to simultaneously resolve two cases
which addressed the same issue.
33. Id. at 97. The ads did not endorse a particular candidate for an election, but were
in the form of editorials taking a political position on a general issue (in this case, a
national organization of businessmen opposed to the Vietnam War). The broadcaster
maintained "that since it presented full and fair coverage of important public questions,
including the Vietnam conflict, it was justified in refusing to accept [any paid] editorial
advertisements." Id. at 98.
34. Id. at 97.
35. Id. at 132.
36. Id. at 121.
37. Public television stations first came into existence following passage of the Public
Broadcasting Act of Nov. 7, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967). Broadly
speaking, public television licensees must follow most of the same regulations as private
noncommercial and commercial broadcasters.
38. 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982).
39. KUHT-TV also canceled its scheduled broadcast of the program. See Barnstone v.
University of Houston, 514 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Barnstone v. University of
Houston, 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981).
40. 688 F.2d at 1037.
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networks to air the program.41 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said
that "under the existing statutes . . ., as state instrumentalities, these
public licensees are without the protection of the First Amendment," and
therefore the principle that the broadcaster's First Amendment speech
42
rights outweighed individual free speech rights did not apply.
However, the lack of First Amendment protection for public broadcasters
"does not result in individual viewers gaining any greater right to
43
influence the programming discretion of the public licensees."
Instead, the court focused on whether public television, as public
property, is a public forum, with only a limited right to exclude speakers
and programs from its airwaves.44
The court explained that in "cases in which a public facility has been
deemed a public forum the speakers have been found to have a right of
access because they were attempting to use the facility in a manner fully
consistent with the 'pattern of usual activity' and 'the general invitation
extended.' ' 45 The court concluded that here "the general invitation
extended" was to watch programs, not to schedule them, and thus it was
"clear that the public television stations involved in the cases before us
are not public forums. The plaintiffs have no right of access to compel
the broadcast of any particular program. ,46 Plaintiffs argued, in the
alternative, that even if public television was not a public forum, the
broadcaster still violated viewers' and producers' First Amendment
rights when it "canceled a scheduled program because of the officials'
opposition to the program's political content."47
The court held,
however, that "editorial decisions of public television stations owned and
operated by the state ...[should not necessarily] ... be viewed in the
same manner and subjected to the same restrictions as state regulatory
activity affecting speech in other areas."4 8 The court reasoned that the
government had a right to exercise editorial control over its own
medium, and "political motivation" is one essential element of the

41. Id.
42. Id. at 1041. The court cited principles as established in Columbia Broadcast
Systems, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973). Id.
43. 688 F.2d at 1041.
44. Id. at 1042. At the time of Muir, the Supreme Court had held that "a facility is a
public forum only if it is designed to provide a general public right of access to its use, or
if such public access has historically existed and is not incompatible with the facility's
primary activity." Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1043.
48. Id.
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decision-making process, particularly when deciding what political issues
to cover "under the public interest standard."4 9
Public forum jurisprudence crystalized shortly after Muir was decided.
In PerryEducation Ass'n v. PerryLocal Educators'Ass'n, ° the Supreme
Court divided public (government-owned) property into three forum
categories and specified the scrutiny level for each. The Court defined
"traditional public forums" as "places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate," and listed
streets and parks as quintessential examples. 1 For a state to exclude
altogether particular speech from a traditional public forum, "it must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."52 The Court
defined a second category, the "designated public forum," as consisting
"of public property which the state has [temporarily] opened for use by
the public as a place for expressive activity."53 The Court said that as
long as this designated public forum existed, it was entitled to the same
protection from government regulation, and the regulation was subject
to the same scrutiny as in a traditional public forum.54 The third
category defined by the Court applied to public property "not held open
to the general public."55 In a "nonpublic forum," the state "may reserve
the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long
as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.""
The concept of public and nonpublic fora was further explored in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.57 Here,
an executive order excluded respondents (eight legal defense organiza-

49. Id. at 1044.
50. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In this case, Perry Education Association, the locally-elected
teachers' union for the Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, was given exclusive
access to the school's internal mail system as well as to individual teacher mailboxes. A
rival union sued for the right to leave literature in the teachers' mailboxes under the
theory that the mail system constituted a public forum, and that the government was
unconstitutionally restricting the rival unions' speech. Id. at 39-41. The court held that
the school mail system was a nonpublic forum. Id. at 53. The court found for defendants.
Id. at 55.
51. Id. at 45.
52. Id. The court also said that in a public forum, the state could regulate the time,
place, and manner of the speech as long as those regulations were "narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest." Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 46.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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tions) from participating in the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), a
charity drive administered by distributing fund raising literature to
federal employees while at work. Respondents maintained that the CFC
was a designated public forum, and that the government impermissibly
excluded them based on its disagreement with their viewpoints.5 8 The
Supreme Court first agreed that the fund drive itself, not the workplace,
was the forum in controversy.59 The Court observed that "the government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for
public discourse." 0 The Court noted, however, that "the government
was motivated [not] by an affirmative desire to provide an open forum
for charitable solicitation in the federal workplace when it began the
Campaign, ... [but by a need] ... to minimize the disruption to the
workplace that had resulted from unlimited ad hoc solicitation activities."6 In light of the government's intent, the Court concluded the
CFC was a nonpublic forum.62
In the second step of its analysis, the Court said the government could
restrict the access of participants to a nonpublic forum only if "the
distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral."63
The Court concluded that the
government could reasonably draw a distinction between politically
neutral charities and politically motivated legal funds.64 Furthermore,
because the CFC was created to minimize disruption in the workplace,
the government could reasonably conclude that excluding political
charities would prevent controversy and achieve the government's
purpose.65
Forum analysis played an increasingly significant part in the political
candidate debate cases which followed, although the first one, Johnson
v. Federal Communications Commission,66 eschewed it altogether.
Here, the Citizens Party candidate was excluded from a 1984 presidential debate produced by the League of Women Voters and broadcast on

58. Id. at 790-94.
59. Id. at 801. The Court analogized that the CFC was to the federal workplace what
the internal mail system in Perry was to the entire school system. Id.
60. Id. at 802.
61. Id. at 805.
62. Id. at 806.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 809.
65. Id. at 810. The Court, however, remanded the case to determine whether the
Government's exclusion, based on the rationale of avoiding controversy, was a facade for
impermissible viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 812-13.
66. 829 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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both public and commercial television. 7 The D.C. Circuit Court chose
not to apply the Cornelius principles to distinguish, for forum purposes,
between the debate as a program and the networks as a whole, holding
simply that "petitioners have stated no legally cognizable claim to
participate in the broadcast debates.""8 The court looked to CBS in
reaffirming that individuals had only limited rights of access to
broadcast media, and then only when granted by statute (via the FCC),
not by the First Amendment. 9
In DeYoung v. Patten,70 decided in 1990, the Eighth Circuit briefly
mentioned the forum issue in deciding a question of debate access, but
came to the same conclusion as the D.C. Circuit in Johnson. DeYoung,
a minor-party, ballot-qualified candidate for the U.S. Senate, was denied
access to a debate produced and televised by Iowa Public Television
("IPTV"). 7"
After the election, DeYoung sued IPTV for monetary
damages.72 The court cited both CBS and Johnson when it stated that
"as a candidate, DeYoung has no first amendment right to appear on
television .. .[beyond that] granted by the equal time provision of the
Federal Communications Act." 73 The court also concluded that "a
public television station like IPTV is not a public forum for purposes of
the First Amendment," citing Muir for the proposition that a public
television station's general invitation extends to viewers, not participants. 4
Seven months after the Eighth Circuit decided that a balloted
candidate for public office had no constitutional right to appear on a
public television debate, the Eleventh Circuit created the right. In
Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission
("GPTC"), 5 the Libertarian nominees for lieutenant governor and
governor sought to enjoin GPTC from broadcasting two political debates
without them. GPTC argued that it had the right to exclude the
candidates because they were not "newsworthy. '76
Although the
majority opinion did not explicitly brand either the network or the
debate as a nonpublic forum (relying on Muir), it did apply the nonpublic

67. Id. at 159. Petitioners qualified for ballot inclusion in nineteen states and
eventually received .08 percent of the vote. Id. at 158-59.
68. Id. at 162.
69. Id. at 165.
70. 898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990).
71. Id. at 630. The debate featured only the Democratic and Republican nominees. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 632.
74. Id. at 633.
75. 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990).
76. Id. at 490-91.
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forum restriction against excluding a speaker because of his viewpoint. v The court reasoned that "as a public television station, GPTC
is under an obligation to serve the public interest .... GPTC chose to
air a debate between only the Democratic and Republican candidates
because it believed such a debate would be of the most interest and
benefit to the citizens of Georgia."7M According to the court, it was
within GPTC's discretion to limit the debate to any class of participants
it felt would best serve its audience, and that limiting the right is what
makes a debate a nonpublic forum. 79 The court dismissed ballot status
as a valid proxy and stated that the decision about whom to include was
best made by "programmers undertaking to provide an educational
The dissent
program of sufficient interest to attract viewers." °
asserted that although "the government of Georgia has created a
nonpublic forum,"8 ' excluding one of the three ballot-qualified candidates was "not a reasonable method of achieving the debates' informational goals." 2
The tide continued to turn in 1994, when the Eighth Circuit in Forbes
I overturned DeYoung by declaring debates produced by public television
networks to be nonpublic fora, but holding that candidates had a
qualified right of access. 3 Simultaneously, the Third Circuit addressed
the same issue in Arons v. Donovan,8 4 when an independent gubernatorial candidate was excluded from debates produced by the New Jersey
Public Broadcasting Authority ("NJPBA")."5 The district court held
that "plaintiff did have a qualified right of access to the airwaves created
by a government sponsorship of the Authority's programming. Further,
the Court agrees with the holding in Forbes which supports a right to
appear on public television beyond that which is granted by 47 U.S.C.

77. Id. at 488-89.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 489.
81. Id. at 491 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
82. Id. 'The dissent also argued that GPTC's decision was not viewpoint-neutral, as
required by Perry and Corneliusfor nonpublic forums. The dissent quoted testimony from
the executive director of GPTC, in which he repeatedly stated that he felt the audience
would not be interested in the Libertarian candidates' viewpoint. For example: "I think
...that the value of the program was that only these two sets of views would be expressed
.... " Id. at 492 (quoting Transcript .of Evidentiary Hearing at 33, Chandler v. Georgia
Public Telecomm. Comm'n, 749 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (No. Civ. A. 190CV2040MHS)).
83. See Forbes, 22 F.3d at 1423.
84. 882 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.J. 1995).
85. Id. at 382.
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§ 315. "s6 The court in Arons used nonpublic forum scrutiny to decide
whether the candidate was excluded because of her views. 7 Finding
no evidence of viewpoint discrimination, and determining that the
NJPBA's exclusion of Arons was based on a state statutory definition of
"qualified candidate," the court dismissed Arons's claim."8
In August 1996, Forbes 11 9 was decided. For the first time, a public
television debate was declared a "limited public forum."90 The Eighth
Circuit held that AETC's conclusion that Forbes was not "viable" or
"newsworthy" was not a sufficient reason to exclude him.91 One month
later, another panel of Eighth Circuit judges came to a different
conclusion under similar but distinguishable facts. In Marcus v. Iowa
Public Television ("IPTV"),92 minority candidates sought injunctive
relief to compel IPTV to include them on a panel discussion program
("Iowa Press") featuring only Democrat and Republican nominees. IPTV
had denied Plaintiffs' request to participate on the grounds they were
not "newsworthy," but offered them time on another program.93 The
appeals court accepted that Iowa Press was essentially a debate and "a
limited public forum [open] to qualified congressional candidates."94
The court said that a compelling state interest, narrowly tailored to meet
the forum's goals, was necessary to exclude a member of that class of
speakers but found that IPTV had met that burden.95 The court
distinguished IPTV's criteria (newsworthiness) from that used by AETC
(viability):
ForbesH cannot be read to mandate the inclusion of every candidate
on the ballot for any debate sponsored by a public television station
....

Rather, Forbes II held that there was no compelling interest in

excluding statutorily-defined viable candidates from a debate based on
the viability of the candidate. Unlike "viability," which is ultimately
for the voters to decide, "newsworthiness" is peculiarly a decision
within the domain of journalists. 9

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 388-89.
93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 499-50.
Id.
97 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1138-39.
Id. at 1141.
Id.
Id. at 1142.
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The court concluded that IPTV had a compelling interest in limiting
access to Iowa Press to newsworthy candidates, that its methods were
narrowly tailored, and that "IPTV's professional broadcasters are
generally better aware of what constitutes appropriate programming
than a group of federal judges." 7
Against this backdrop of conflicting appellate opinions, the Supreme
Court the following year granted certiorari in Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes.9"
III.

SUPREME COURT RATIONALE

The Supreme Court agreed to hear Forbes both because of the Eighth
Circuit-Eleventh Circuit split and because of "the manifest importance
of the case."99 In reversing the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Court rejected Forbes's contention that the political debate broadcast by
AETN was a public forum, as well as his alternative argument that even
if the debate was a nonpublic forum, AETC improperly and unreasonably
excluded Forbes because of his viewpoint.0 0
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began his forum analysis by
distinguishing between public television generally and the debate
The Court confirmed twenty-five years of
program specifically.'
decisions, citing Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, °2 and using a Muir' analysis. The Court held
that "in the case of television broadcasting, . . . broad rights of access for
outside speakers would be antithetical ... to the discretion that stations
and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose
and statutory obligations,"'0 4 and that "in most cases, the First
broadcasters to allow
Amendment of its own force does not compel"0public
5
third parties access to their programming. 1
However, the Court declared that while "public broadcasting as a
general matter does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine,
candidate debates present the narrow exception to the rule."'0 6 The
Court gave two reasons for assigning these debates forum status. First,

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1144.
520 U.S. 1114 (1997).
118 S. Ct. at 1638.
Id. at 1644.
Id. at 1637.
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982,).
118 S. Ct. at 1639.
Id. at 1640.
Id. (emphasis added).
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"unlike AETC's other broadcasts, the debate was by design a forum for
political speech by the candidates .... The very purpose of the debate

was to allow the candidates to express their views with minimal
intrusion by the broadcaster."1" 7 Second, in noting that "candidate
debates are of exceptional significance in the electoral process,"108 the
Court used public policy concerns to support classifying the debate in
such a way that it would receive closer scrutiny.0 9
In rejecting Forbes's argument that the debate should be classified as
a public forum, the Court used criteria first expounded in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & EducationalFund, Inc.11o The Court emphasized that "general access" is the touchstone concept for designated
public forums, while "'selective access'. . . indicates the property is a
nonpublic forum.""' Elaborating on that concept, the Court stated
that:
on one hand, the government creates a designated public forum when
it makes its property generally available to a certain class of speakers
...[any of whom may use the property as they please, without further
permission]. On the other hand, the government does not create a
designated public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility
for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose
members must then, as individuals, "obtain permission" to use it."'
The Court noted that AETC did not make the debate generally open
to all members of the eligible class, the candidates for the Third
Congressional District seat." 3 Rather, "just as the Government in
Cornelius made agency-by-agency determinations as to which of the
eligible agencies would participate in the CFC, AETC made candidate-

by-candidate determinations as to which of the eligible candidates would
participate in the debate."" 4 The government's reservation of right of
access, therefore, made the debate a nonpublic forum." 5

107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Id. "[lit is of particular importance that candidates have the opportunity to make
their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates'
personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them
on election day." Id. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981)).
110. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
111. 118 S.Ct. at 1642 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803-05).
112. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804 (emphasis added)). See also Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981) (where state university created a public forum for
registered student groups by making its meeting facilities "generally open" to such groups).
113. 118 S.Ct. at 1642.
114. Id. at 1642-43.
115. Id.
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The Court again buttressed its conclusion with public policy considerations. According to the Court, labeling candidate debates as designated
public forums would force public television stations to provide access to
all ballot-qualified candidates, which could pose a severe and logistically
untenable burden on the broadcaster.116 "Were it faced with the
prospect of cacophony, on the one hand, and First Amendment liability,
on the other, a public television broadcaster might choose not to air
candidates' views at all," a result that would repress free speech, rather
than promote it.1 7 As evidence that its concerns were not merely
speculative, the Court noted that the Nebraska Educational Television
Network had canceled its senatorial debate following the broadcasteradverse ruling of Forbes 11.118
Because AETC's debate was a nonpublic forum, AETC had the right
to exclude any individual candidate, as long as the decision was not
based on the speaker's viewpoint and reasonably advanced the purpose
of the property. 1 9 In taking AETC at its word, the Court rejected outof-hand Forbes's contention that his exclusion was an unreasonable
exercise of viewpoint discrimination. 2 ° Citing trial record testimony
by AETC Executive Director Susan Howarth, as well as testimony from
Forbes himself, the Court held that "it is, in short, beyond dispute that
Forbes was excluded not because of his viewpoint but because he had
generated no appreciable public interest .... [h]is own objective lack

of support, not his platform, was the criterion." 21 The Court held that
he was excluded because of his status as a nonviable candidate, not
because of his views, consistent with the principles of PerryEducational
Ass'n, "'2 rendering AETC's decision "a reasonable viewpoint-neutral
exercise123 of journalistic discretion consistent with the First Amendment."

Justice Stevens authored the dissent 24 and argued generally that
the Court's decision gave AETC too much flexibility in setting standards
for exclusion of candidates. 25 Ironically, he said, only private broad-

116. Id. at 1643. The Court cited several statistical studies that showed that in 1988,
1992, and 1996, "no fewer than 22 candidates appeared on the ballot in at least one State,"
and that in the 1996 congressional elections, "it was common for 6 to 11 candidates to
qualify for the ballot for a particular seat." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, Aug. 24, 1966, at 1A).
119. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 810).
120. Id. at 1644.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49).

123.

Id.

124. Justices Ginsburg and Souter joined in the dissent.
125. 118 S. Ct. at 1644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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casters, who are not an arm of government, are now statutorily required
to follow "pre-established objective criteria to determine which candidates may participate in [the] debate;" 126 Forbes allows public broadcasters to disregard that regulation and exercise "nearly limitless
discretion ... ad hoc."' 27 The dissent warned that "lbecause AETC is
owned by the State, deference to its interest in making ad hoc decisions
about the political content of its programs necessarily increases the risk
of government censorship and propaganda
in a way that protection of
28
privately owned broadcasters does not."

The dissent also argued that even if AETC reserved the right to decide
whether to invite or exclude individual candidates, it should still be
limited in its decision-making process by the scope of the debate as it
could be objectively defined. 129 According to the dissent, such "arbitrary definitions of the scope of the forum"' reasoning would effectively permit a public television station to define the scope of a debate
based on whom and how it excludes, rather than be restricted in whom
and how it excludes by the scope of the debate.'' In other words, the
scope of a debate including only viable candidates is only as wide or
narrow as AETC's definition of viability: "The dispositive issue in this
case, then, is not whether AETC created a designated public forum or a
nonpublic forum, ...

but whether AETC defined the contours of the

debate forum with sufficient
specificity to justify the exclusion of a
2
ballot-qualified candidate."1

126. Id. at 1645. The court quoted regulations promulgated in conjunction with the
Federal Election Campaigns Act:
(c) Criteria for candidate selection. For all debates, staging organization(s) must
use pre-established objective criteria to determine which candidates may
participate in a debate. For general election debates, staging organization(s) shall
not use nomination by a particular political party as the sole objective criterion to
determine whether to include a candidate in a debate.
11 CFR § 110.13(c) (1997).
127. 118 S. Ct. at 1645. (The dissent argued implicitly that AETC, as a state agent,
should be held to a higher, not lower standard.)
128. Id. at 1647. The dissent cited Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969),
for its argument to tighten the reigns on all broadcasters. Shuttlesworth held that when
a law allows license requirements to restrict First Amendment freedoms-in this case, the
right to participate in a parade-those license requirements must follow narrow, objective,
and definite standards. Id. at 150-51. While Shuttlesworth concerned a defendant who
was convicted for participating in a parade without a license, the dissent applied the
holding broadly to assert that any licensed (not just licensing) entity which restricts free
speech should be made to abide by those standards. 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
129. 118 S. Ct. at 1649.
130. Id. at 1647.
131. Id. at 1649 n.18.
132. Id. at 1647.
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Even accepting
the reasonableness
of "viability" or
"newsworthiness" 3 ' as criteria limiting the scope of the debate and the
dimension of the forum, the dissent maintained that AETC did not
consistently follow its own definition of those terms."' The dissent
pointed out that two invited candidates from other districts "had
virtually no chance of winning, and that one of them raised less money
than Forbes." 3 ' The dissent agreed that all ballot-qualified candidates
should not automatically be guaranteed inclusion in any state-sponsored
debate, but disputed the Court's implication that such a result is the
only alternative to allowing "ad hoc" journalistic discretion.'3 6 The
dissent also noted that AETC's exclusion of Forbes had the practical
effect, if not the purpose, of excluding his specific viewpoint. 37 The
dissent concluded that "the importance of avoiding arbitrary or
viewpoint-based exclusions from political debates militates strongly in
favor of requiring the controlling state agency to use (and adhere to) preestablished, objective criteria to determine who among qualified
candidates may participate." 3 8
IV. LEGAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes simplified the law for public broadcasters wishing
to stage candidate debates while, as Justice Stevens pointed out, putting
them under even less scrutiny than commercial broadcasters.'39 While
the ruling will likely clear future court dockets, it does so potentially at
the expense of fringe candidates across the country. After Forbes, a
candidate wishing to challenge his or her exclusion from a debate may
only attack the reasonableness or viewpoint-neutrality of the selection
process. As past decisions have shown, courts are hesitant to characterize editorial decisions as anything other than the reasonable exercise of

133. AETC executives testified initially that Forbes was excluded because he was not
considered a "viable" candidate, but briefs and arguments at the Supreme Court level
emphasized that Forbes was excluded because he was not considered "newsworthy." Id.
at 1648.
134. Id. at 1648-49. AETC cited Forbes's chance of winning, his impact on the election,
and the amount of money he raised as key criteria in determining whether Forbes was
viable or newsworthy. Id. at 1645 n.6.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1649.
137. Id. at 1648 n.14.
138. Id. at 1649.
139. Public television is now held to a constitutional standard, while private
broadcasters continue to be bound by the regulatory language of section 110.13(c). See
supra note 126.
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Without a showing of blatant

viewpoint-based, or otherwise unreasonable, discrimination in the
exclusion process, judgment against the candidate will be swift and sure,
as has already been demonstrated in the Eighth Circuit's post-Forbesfull
hearing of Marcus v. Iowa Public Television.'
Public television, for
its part, would be well-advised to avoid the word "viable" in its screening
process, as evidenced by AETC's strategically successful shift from
"viability" to "newsworthiness" over the course of its case, and given the
Eighth Circuit's
cogent articulation of the difference between the two
142
concepts.
Of course, candidates are still free to attack the network or station's
decision-making process through standard FCC administrative channels.
A candidate could (1) demand equal time, 4 3 (2) dispute whether the
station has allowed "reasonable access [to] ... a legally qualified
candidate for federal elective office," 1' or (3) challenge its service of
the public interest at license renewal time.'
In these matters, the
courts in the Forbes cases (and others) have consistently ruled that an
individual has no private4 right of action until first exhausting FCC
administrative remedies.1 1
Because Forbes allows public television networks to essentially
continue their current practices and policies, it is unlikely the ruling will

140. See, e.g., Muir, 668 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982); Chandler,917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir.
1990); Marcus, 97 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1996).
141. 150 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1998) ("This case is controlled by the Supreme Court
decision in ... Forbes .... In this case, the district court did not clearly err in finding that
the third-party candidates were not excluded on the basis of viewpoint, ...
and we
conclude that their exclusion was otherwise reasonable."). Id. at 925.
142. See Forbes, 97 F.3d at 1144.
143. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994). The equal time provision does not give the candidate
the right to appear on the debate, but may provide the candidate an opportunity to be
interviewed on a separate program (see Marcus v. Iowa Pub. Television, No. 4-96-CV-80690,
1996 WL 764143, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 9, 1996)). However, the "bona fide news" exception
of the equal time provision has been interpreted to apply to candidate debates (see Chisolm
v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
144. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994). But cf., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981)
("The Commission has stated that, in enforcing the statute, it will 'provide leeway to
broadcasters and not merely attempt de novo to determine the reasonableness of their judgments'" (quoting 74 F.C.C.2d at 672)).
145. Id. § 307 (1994). However, "starting in the 1980's, the FCC ... began the practice
of renewing all broadcast licenses without ever finding a broadcaster to have failed to serve
the public interest." Reed E. Hundt, The Public'sAirwaves: What Does the Public Interest
Require of Television Broadcasters?,45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1094 (1996).
146. Forbes, 22 F.3d at 1428. See also DeYoung, 898 F.2d at 634.
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effect any change in the status quo. 147 Perhaps the consequences of
this decision can best be understood by the change it will not engender.
Certainly a decision requiring that all ballot-qualified candidates be
guaranteed access to candidate debates would have had far-reaching
consequences, at least in those states where election laws make it easy
for candidates to get on the ballot. During the brief period when Forbes
II was the law of the land in the Eighth Circuit, Nebraska Educational
Television Network canceled its planned debate because the Network
considered accommodating all ballot-qualified candidates to be too
burdensome.14 However, a decision requiring pre-existing published
criteria for inclusion congruent with that found in the Code of Federal
Regulations, 149 as urged by Justice Stevens's dissent, would likely have
created little additional burden on broadcasters, especially considering
that the burden is already borne by private broadcasters and other
entities. 5 ' Even those broadcasters that have not published guidelines
should not find it beyond their own expertise, given their obligations as
government licensees, to promulgate one more set of protocols. In
perhaps the most neutral of several amicus briefs presented in Forbes,
the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law
reminded the Court that:
a broadcaster sponsoring and televising a campaign debate effectively
selects and p'romotes candidates for the attention of voters. That

147. With one exception (see supra note 140, and accompanying text), all published
cases as of February 1999 which have cited Forbes for support have applied the Forbes
forum analysis to nonpolitical (even nonbroadcasting) contexts. See, e.g., Children of the
Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the city could restrict
controversial advertising from its buses because the city had always restricted access based
on certain published criteria and therefore had created a nonpublic forum); The Putnam
Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 23 F. Supp. 2d 822 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (holding that a
municipality making links available on its web site had not created a public forum);
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Bennett, No. 4:97CV2109 TCM, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19473 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that Forbes created forum exception for candidate debates
only and that broadcasting of underwriting acknowledgments (advertising) on public radio
is not a forum at all; therefore station's decision to refuse underwriting from particular
donor entitled to no constitutional scrutiny).
148. See supra note 118. In 1998 NETN did in fact broadcast a debate between the
state's gubernatorial candidates. The debate featured only the Democrat and Republican
nominees.
149. 11 CFR § 110.13(c).
150. Id. See also Amicus Brief of Commission on Presidential Debates, Arkansas Educ.
Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779) (available at 1997 WL 311466, at
*2-3 (U.S. May 30, 1997)). The Commission acknowledged that it "has developed,
nonpartisan criteria to ensure tht it identifies all of the candidates in a particular election
year who ... in light of the educational goals of the CPD's debates, properly should be
invited to participate in those debates." Id.
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selection, when done by a state actor, must be based on articulable,
objective standards .... When addressing restrictions on activities

involving speech even in less compelling contexts, the Court has
repeatedly insisted that the government officials must be guided by
clear, precise, and legitimate
standards in deciding how to apply
51
regulatory decisions.
Any dire predictions that the Forbes ruling will significantly stifle
public discourse depend upon the premise that public television will take
advantage of Forbes by limiting debates to mainstream candidates, or
that public television is already doing so and will continue this policy.
A brief survey of 1998's public television debate schedule does not
support this premise, however. Public television stations or networks in
nineteen states broadcast debates encompassing a variety of elective
offices. In eleven of those states, all ballot-qualified candidates for each
office were invited. Access was restricted to "major" candidates (usually
two out of an average of four) in only five states, while the networks'
policy was unclear in three cases. In the eleven states where all
candidates were invited, the average number of participants was 3.5,
with Maine, Vermont, and (ironically) Iowa providing access to up to six
candidates on the same stage.'5 2 Nationally, the average number of
ballot-qualified candidates for governor and senate hovered near four,
with congressional elections attracting less than three candidates per
race. 153 Apparently, public television is not conspicuously taking
advantage of its freedom to limit debate participation.

151. Amicus Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School
of Law, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S.Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779)
(available at 1997 WL 384770, at *14-15 (U.S. July 2, 1997)).
152. Arkansas Educational Public Television, apparently deciding that Arkansas's
gubernatorial and senatorial Reform Party candidates were "newsworthy," featured all
three ballot-qualified candidates in its 1998 televised debates. Debate participant
information was gathered through a comprehensive search of over one hundred public
television station and network web sites. See PBS Stations (visited Oct. 25-31, 1998)
<http://www.pbs.org/stations/.
153. 1998 Gubernatorial races averaged 4.2 candidates on the ballot in each of the
thirty-seven states holding elections for that office. Fifteen of those states featured three
candidates or less, eight states each had four and five candidates, and a total of four states
had six or more candidates on the ballot. The average for U.S. Senate was 4.1 candidates
per ballot, with fourteen of those states featuring three candidates or less, ten with four
candidates, eleven with five or more. A sampling of fifty congressional races (from the
state's Third District, if there was one, or First District if there was not) yielded an average
of 2.8. Thirty-eight of those states had three candidates or less, eight had four candidates,
three had five, and one state boasted six candidates. The most "cacophonous" state was
New York, with ten candidates on the ballot for governor. See Democracy Network (visited
Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.dnet.org>; Campaign 98 CBS News (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.cbs.com/navbar/news.html>.
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Still, many academians as well as interested parties predict a
dampening effect on the political process, as well as a distorting effect
on actual election results. In the 1992 congressional election, for
example, Ralph Forbes could have forced a runoff between the Democratic and Republican candidates by drawing 548 more votes away from the
Republican winner. 15 4
One must wonder whether Reform Party
candidate Jesse Ventura would have been elected governor of Minnesota
had AETC produced Minnesota's candidate debates. Even if a network
were to judge Ventura as more "newsworthy" than Forbes merely
because he is a more colorful figure, does that necessarily advance the
democratic process? Public television was created, after all, not to
compete with commercial broadcasting, but "to encourage public
telecommunications services .. .which will constitute an expression of
diversity and excellence, and which will constitute a source of alternative
telecommunications services for all citizens."' 55 Yet after Forbes,
public television is held to an even looser standard of public service than
private broadcasting. The law is now clear and its application straightforward. Where it leads public television depends on where public
television chooses to take it.
DANIEL

B. GREENFIELD

154. See 1992 Arkansas General Election results, as printed in the appendix to
Respondent's Brief, Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (No. 96-779, 1997 WL 664266 at *169a, July
2, 1997). Out of a total of 249,494 votes, the Republican candidate received 125,295 votes
(or 50.22%), the Democrat received 117,775 votes (47.20%), and Forbes received 6,329 votes
(2.54%). Id. The runoff scenario described in the accompanying text would admittedly
require Forbes to draw all his additional votes from the Republican candidate. While that
may be unlikely, Forbes's right wing views had traditionally appealed more to Republicans
than Democrats. Interestingly, Forbes was on the ballot for the same seat again in 1998.
This time his only opposition was Republican Asa Hutchinson, and he received nineteen
percent of the vote.
155. Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).

